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ABSTRACT: Humans are at their best when they are making things: families, social 
systems, music, mathematics, etc. This is human flourishing, to use the word in the 
somewhat un-idiomatic way that has come to be standard in translating Aristotle and 
developing views like his. We admire well-made things of all these kinds, and the 
people who make them well. And although "happiness" is not a good translation of 
Aristotle's edudaimonia, it is a plausible conjecture about human psychology that people 
are happiest — most content, most satisfied with their lives, least troubled — when 
they are accomplishing, making, things of all these kinds, from families to mathematics. 
And they are miserable when they cannot. One kind of misery comes when one's 
efforts are not successful. Families fail, music is detested, "theorems" have 
counterexamples. Another kind of misery comes when one is blocked from being able 
to achieve any of the things that human life is shaped around. The focus of this paper 
is on ways that people's actions can make other people incapable of achieving properly 
human lives. This is what I call damage. I think its importance has only recently come 
to be appreciated; the delay in acknowledging it as a central moral concept has been 
particularly long in philosophy. And in human cultures worldwide an appreciation of 
how vulnerable we are to psychological damage is very recent. 
KEYWORDS: atrocity, cooperation, damage, ethics, evil, harm, human 
flourishing, imagination, morality, utilitarianism. 
1. Damage 
Consider first rape and the sexual abuse of children. These are dramatically awful 
examples of what I have in mind, and I will consider less extreme phenomena soon. My 
aim is to draw attention to the real reason that they are so wrong: they damage people. 
These reasons waited for our time: my lifetime, I think, and I was typical in coming 
slowly to the realization. Not long ago while decent people would have thought of them 
as wrong, often very wrong, they would have traced the wrongness to violation of 
autonomy and infliction of short term pain. The perpetrator is doing something to 
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someone against their will, and it hurts. In other cultures the wrongness is also traced 
to factors that now seem to us perverse. In Roman culture the rape of a daughter or a 
servant is taken as an offence against the paterfamilias, and in Greek culture the rape of 
a woman in the temple of a goddess will usually lead to the goddess’ anger at the woman 
for defiling her space, rather than at the rapist. One is reminded of reports of 
contemporary cultures in which rape victims are charged with adultery. But we have 
come to see a basic thing that is missing from these reactions. The victims are often 
damaged in a deep and long term way, which is sometimes seen as akin to post-traumatic 
stress. They can be prone to depression, irrational feelings of guilt, a sense of being bad 
and unworthy, and in some cases suicidal tendencies. Their capacity to flourish is 
drastically reduced (Resick 1993). I shall speak of a wide range of injuries to peoples 
capacities to lead satisfying lives as damage. I shall avoid the word "harm", because for 
my purposes it is awkwardly between pain and the damage that concerns me. 
The authorities of the Catholic Church are generally decent and sympathetic 
people, and they never dreamt of anything but condemnation of abusive priests. But 
they took the grounds for the condemnation to be forbidden sex rather than terrible 
wounding. Though this is a conjecture, some support is given by the papal document 
Sacramentum Poenitentiae, which takes the crime to be a violation of the commandment 
against adultery.  
There are many ways in which people can be damaged, and many of them were 
invisible until recently. Post-traumatic stress, first noticed as "shell shock" after the first 
world war, is an example. We now see it as occurring also in milder forms. Similarly we 
thought of torture as the infliction of great pain, which it usually is. But in so doing we 
ignored the great injury to a person's conception of herself and ability to function, of 
which there is now abundant evidence. Torture, like post-traumatic stress, can also take 
milder forms, and can be subtle and psychological rather than overtly physical. 
(Bernstein 2015, Kashdana, Todd, and others 2006.) There are many other undramatic 
kinds of damage. We have learned that corporal punishment of children does not make 
them become well-adjusted and considerate adults. A vitally important topic is that of 
subtle implicit prejudice. There is now a lot of evidence that having one's attention 
drawn to one's membership in a group thought to be less capable reduces one's 
performance on tasks requiring attention and skill. (Schmader, Johns, and Forbes 2008.) 
One functions less well. 
Recent work by both economists and psychologists suggests that stress coming 
from long-term deprivation, frustration, and envy of others disrupts the reward system 
in the brain and can lead to despair. The economists Case and Deaton (2017) use the 
phrase "deaths of despair" to refer to the epidemic of drug and alcohol abuse and suicide 
among working-class white Americans in the past decade. And the psychologist, 
Martinez (2010) gives empirical evidence that feeling oppressed and unappreciated 
interferes with the reward system in the brain, involving the neurotransmitter dopamine, 
in a way that makes a person prone to addiction. There is also a fair amount of data that 
bringing attention to the fact that one is from a low status group that is not expected to 
succeed at difficult tasks disrupts short-term memory in a way that does indeed interfere 
with difficult tasks (Steele and Aronson 1995, Schmader 2008). So prejudice is in this 
way self confirming. 
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2. Utilitarianism and Kantian ethics 
 
Damaged people, according to this evidence, have less pleasant lives and accomplish 
less of what they want. Thus according to most versions of utilitarianism it will be wrong 
to inflict the damage. But this misses a point. The real damage is to their capacities, and 
not to their experiences. A person who overcomes harm that is done to them in order 
to achieve a satisfactory life has still been harmed, and the infliction of this harm is still 
wrong. It is certainly possible that the wrongness can be squeezed into a utilitarian 
framework. Almost any moral consideration can, with enough effort. But the aim would 
seem to be mistaken, since the victim is the person herself and not her experience. In 
fact, much of the harm that is done will not be reflected in the person's experience, 
since it will consist in projects not attempted, potential satisfactions never gained, and 
accomplishments that were never possible for the person in question.. 
We can also make connections with Kantian, deontological, ethics (Williams 
1973b, 1985). Take the heart of the ethic in the form that one should take every person 
as an end rather than as a means. (And there is an implicit principle that this is 
nonnegotiable, and does not get weighed against other good and bad things.) Then it 
is in the same general territory as the golden rule in Christianity (Matthew 7:12: "love 
thy neighbour as thyself"), or in Islam several passages in the Hadith, such as Kitab 
al-Kafi, vol. 2, p. 146, where the prophet gives as a rule "as you would have people 
do to you, do to them; and what you dislike to be done to you, do not do to them.” 
So given that you do not want to be damaged, you do not want to inflict damage. 
But again there are differences. They are very similar to the differences from 
utilitarianism. What you want is largely available to you in terms of what you consciously 
want, and the focus now includes forms of damage that you are not consciously aware 
of. Otherwise we would not need the empirical evidence that such events are as harmful 
as we now realize. And in fact a person may think that she wants something that is in 
fact harmful to her, such as the continuing availability of her drug, or her deference to 
the men in her life. There are other similarities and differences too. The concern is for 
the person herself and her capacities in both Kantian ethics and damage-avoidance. On 
the other hand, damage obviously comes in larger and smaller forms, ranging from the 
catastrophic to the trivial. So any damage-avoiding ethics will have to include ways of 
balancing lesser and greater benefits and evils. 
Benefits as well as evils: you can increase as well as diminish a person's capacity to 
flourish. A parent talking seriously and articulately to a child does the child a service 
that she may never appreciate. And taking an abused person seriously and 
compassionately, showing that you appreciate the harm that has been done to them, 
goes a small way to mitigating that harm. (Being nice to people is no substitute for not 
hurting them in the first place, though. And recovery from serious damage is not 
accomplished by niceness alone.) 
 
3. The two neighbours 
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Why were these things ignored? I suspect three related factors. One is the special nature 
of our capacities for imagining each other. They have developed to mediate standard 
forms of social life and cooperative activity. So they focus on grasping other people's 
intentions and actions: the desires actions aim to satisfy and the beliefs that shape them. 
The other is emphasis on features of people's minds that they are conscious of. But 
people often do not know even that they are damaged.  
The third factor connects the first two. Our intuitive ways of getting on with one 
another and our official codes of ethics typically serve to foster cooperation between 
individuals and groups in shared projects. I will help you harvest your crops if you will 
watch over my children. And these cooperative routines and conventions can 
themselves be implicated in damage. People who are not very ambitious for themselves 
and do not have much faith in their own capacities tend to be content to play a small 
role in the plans of others and the enterprises of larger groups. So people kept in a state 
in which they are somewhat limited and conformist are likely to be faithful participants 
in shared plans. They do not have the confidence in their own abilities — in fact many 
of these abilities may well longer exist — or the originality needed to make plans of 
their own. 
This situation can be illustrated with an example I have used elsewhere (Morton 
2009).  (The description of the situation also gives the example a rationale, so that it 
becomes more than an intuition that may well not be shared.) You have two neighbours. 
The person on your right is a model neighbour, returning borrowed tools on time, 
sheltering your children when they come back from school early, and so on. The person 
on your left is far from this, occasionally taking tools from your garage without consent, 
coming home singing loud happy songs late at night, and putting out trash in an insecure 
way that animals get at. In your country a dominant majority maintain their position by 
suppression of a minority. You have defended the rights of the minority, but the 
situation has moved from political debate to physical action, and members of the 
minority and those who support them are being rounded up for no-one knows what 
mistreatment. You plan to disappear and work in secret opposition. But you need a safe 
haven for your children, in a hurry. You could appeal to one of your neighbours. Which 
one should you approach?   
One appealing way of reasoning is treacherous. It is to think “The neighbour on the 
right has always been friendly and cooperative, so the evidence is that she is a good 
person, so she will take personal risks, if need be, to protect my children.” The personal 
characteristics that support judgements of moral character in routine everyday life 
concern a limited variety of situations. Social psychology tells us that human behaviour 
is less consistent from case to case than we tend to assume, even within a given social 
context, and inference from one context to a very different one is even more dubious. 
Moreover the fact that your neighbour on the right is cooperative in small everyday 
matters suggests that she may appreciate the good will of those around her, and be 
uncomfortable with the lack of it. Cooperative people are often conformists, and indeed 
a preference for conformity makes many everyday interactions proceed more smoothly. 
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In the situation we are concerned with now, too great a concern for one's image would 
be a liability. 
One might indeed reason in the opposite direction. “My neighbour on the left is 
nonconformist and independent-minded. He makes up his own ideas about what to do, 
not particularly trying to please those around him. So if either of the two neighbours is 
able to act contrary to the dominant public mood, it is more likely to be him.”   
This contrasting reasoning might also be misleading. The neighbour on the left 
might be a less than model citizen not because he is concerned with more important 
things and thinks for himself, but simply because he is thoughtless and self-centred. But 
at any rate the contrast presents considerations to block the first way of reasoning. You 
need a more sensitive test. 
4. Imagination versus cooperation 
 
I think the more sensitive test of whether these requirements can be met can be 
expressed in terms of imagination. You want to choose someone who can maintain the 
goodwill of conventional members of society while possessing enough insight to see 
how their conformity is based on prejudice. The second of these needs a particularly 
difficult kind of imagination, permitting the person to grasp the un-articulated motives 
and dispositions behind the smooth workings of society. If you can know that either 
neighbour has this capacity, then that is the one that you should choose. If you have no 
alternative, you should choose the one who you think is most likely to have this deep 
imagination (Murdoch 2001).  
In the case of psychological damage as I was describing it earlier, any use of any 
normal imaginative skill within its usual range is likely to be inadequate. That is a basic 
reason why we continue to inflict many kinds of damage on one another without 
realizing quite what we are doing. Imagination has to work together with psychological 
evidence: once we have reason to believe that particular acts can have particular 
consequences we have a chance of being able to imagine the effects on particular people. 
A less demanding example of morally relevant imagination that tends in the same 
general direction is given by Jonathan Bennett's famous case of Huckleberry Finn 
(Bennett 1973). Huck has helped the slave Jim to escape, and realizes that this goes against 
the moral code in which he was raised. He is depriving Jim's owner of her property. 
Bennett quotes Mark Twain as attributing the following thoughts to Huck 
(a)  I couldn’t get that out of my conscience, no how nor no way. ... I tried to 
make out to myself that I warn’t to blame, because I didn’t run Jim off from 
his rightful owner; but it warn’t no use, conscience up and say, every time: ‘But 
you knowed he was running for his freedom, and you could a paddled ashore 
and told somebody.’  
 
(b)  I knowed very well I had done wrong, ... Then I thought a minute, and says 
to myself, hold on—s’pose you’d a done right and give Jim up; would you feel 
better than what you do now? No, says I, I’d feel bad—I’d feel just the same 
way I do now.  
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Two forces are competing in Huck's mind. On the one side there is the code of 
respect for people in his society like those of his family (essentially, propertied white 
people) and cooperation with their projects, and in particular their use of their property. 
He identifies this with right as opposed to wrong action, and with conscience. On the 
other side there is his capacity to imagine the effects of his actions and his failures to 
act on the lives of particular other people, in this case Jim. We, unlike Huck, see that 
this has an equal claim to be labelled as moral. But they conflict. He cannot be a 
cooperative member of his society and also minimize the bad consequences for Jim's 
life. At any rate he cannot fully yield to either of these without neglecting the other. 
(There are sophisticated compromises that will occur to sophisticated thinkers. But he 
is not one.) 
Both the two neighbours example and the Huckleberry Finn example involved 
societies in crisis. (The society in the Huck Finn case does not know that it is in crisis.) 
Political crises  will make moral crises for individuals. Tensions between the same 
competing forces can occur for individuals in non-crisis situations, for example when 
honouring a promise to one person about a matter of middle sized importance would 
mean inflicting serious pain — or serious damage — on another. (The possibility of 
damage is important, because it shows that these conflicts are not always easily 
conceptualized in terms of general rules versus particular consequences.) The rival 
considerations in such cases compete not only for influence on a particular person’s 
actions, but also for the status of morality. 
5. The dark side of morality 
 
The psychology that fosters cooperation in real human beings, and the psychology that 
fosters the imagination of another person’s condition, have their sinister aspects. People 
readily cooperate with others in their own social groups, and often the cooperation is 
in competition with those of other groups. In fact, this may be intrinsic to cooperation 
in finite beings, since the problem of discovering courses of action that are of most 
aggregate benefit to all people in the world is just too hard for our limited minds. So 
cooperation is usually motivated by identity, tribal loyalty, and precedent. It is then 
directed away from members of other groups, and lack of cooperation and outright 
enmity is often directed towards other groups. Members of subgroups that are not part 
of the dominant cooperative scheme, such as children and women, can then easily find 
their claims ignored. In actual imperfect human beings the cooperative impulse can feed 
xenophobia, and indeed abuse. 
A related set of problems accompanies empathy and imagination. This aspect too 
can be selective and biased, since imagining another person accurately is not a trivial 
task. In everyday life one tends to have a detailed and accurate grasp of what will help 
or injure only a small number of people. For all others one uses very rough heuristics 
about what people want and what does them harm, with the result that familiar people 
are treated mechanically and unfamiliar people are taken to be mysteries. I do not think 
we could manage our routine everyday life with others on the basis of one-to-one 
imagination, so that fixed cooperative routines will inevitably take much of the burden 
of our dealings with one another (Harris 2000, Morton 2013). So wherever we place the 
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emphasis, there will be situations where acting in ways that often result in mutual benefit 
in fact produce disaster, injustice, damage. 
The worrying side of the psychology that produces our best behaviour can be made 
dramatic by describing two extreme possible societies. In society A promises are kept, 
compromises are made, efforts are distributed sensibly, and in other ways people work 
together to achieve common aims. Very few think of their society as unjust. But because 
of family structure, the treatment of children, the relations between the sexes, ingrained 
habits of denigration and pessimism, plus many other hard to describe experiences that 
everyone undergoes, there is widespread depression, victimization of vulnerable people, 
and general unhappiness. Few people have wholehearted affection for others, and few 
people attempt anything adventurous or challenging. It is a miserable place, though it 
thinks of itself as highly moral. 
In society B all people are treated with great respect, children are raised carefully 
and affectionately, there is much soul-searching about the effects of practices on the 
well-being and capacities of individuals, and the realization of each person's potentiality 
to its fullest extent is sacred. But this takes time and energy, and as a result few can play 
a full conscientious role in shared projects, promises are kept in only a very cursory way, 
and little attention is paid to working out efficient ways of distributing different people's 
efforts. Here, too, people generally think of their society as highly moral, though the 
aspects they cite are very different to those that members of society A cite. They would 
describe their society in terms of consideration and kindness rather than in terms of 
justice and fairness. (For similar dystopias see Hinckfuss 1987.) 
Society A, the puritans, and society B, the hippies, are both unsatisfactory. This is 
in spite of the fact that members of each think of their core commitments as defining 
the way people collectively ought to be. Is there a best compromise or mixture of them? 
Is there an ideal against which they can both be compared? "Best" and "ideal" here seem 
to beg the question, but I do not know even how to pose these questions more carefully. 
6. Atrocity  
 
The contrast here can be put crudely as the cooperation of a good citizen versus the 
empathy of a sensitive person, especially to individuals she is sharing projects with. We 
need both, but they can conflict and they rest on different sides of human nature, at any 
rate for instinctive reactions and heuristics. One place where the contrast is vivid is in 
issues about mass atrocity, public evil. At any rate it is if one takes a certain line on its 
origins. 
The line comes from Hannah Arendt. (Arendt 1951, 1964, 1971). The central idea, 
as I read her (Morton 2004) is that many of the people essential to large-scale atrocity 
are disturbingly like the rest of us. They are not monsters, though a sprinkling of 
monsters may grease the wheels of atrocity. Rather, they are unimaginative civic-minded 
people, cooperating in a social project that, though they are blind to this, involves 
terrible events for many, especially people that they do not regularly interact with. The 
sprinkling of monsters would cause the project to fail if it were not for the mass of 
sensible, rationally cooperating, citizens who choose effective means to accomplish the 
project. 
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There are many ways of not getting the point. One is to think that all praiseworthy 
actions come from careful deliberation in the light of all morally relevant factors. Then 
of course a high regard for neighbourly cooperation will not lead you to complicity in 
genocide. But simple everyday helpful behaviour will not then count as moral either. 
Perhaps on this view we should actually condemn keeping promises and helping 
colleagues, if they do not stem from the most meticulously pure motives. (Kant actually 
suggests something like this, in chapter 10 of Kant 1785/1997.) Another way of missing 
the point is to insist that the ideal social contract would require people at the same time  
to minimize pain to one another, do one another little psychological damage, and to 
lend a hand in mutually agreed projects. We can have it all, if we formulate the contract 
carefully enough. Well, no one ever has formulated such a contract, and it remains to 
be seen whether it is even possible, given the variety of human situations. We can accept 
that people often do act from an implicit grasp of an understanding with others around 
them of what is allowed is not, and that this regulates many of their actions. But there 
are always large gaps in the areas covered by such implicit contracts, including some 
crucial to human welfare. And inasmuch as they regulate the actions of real people in 
real life they concern behaviour with respect to a limited range of other people in a 
limited range of situations. That is one reason why societies seemingly committed to 
universal benevolence have regularly been involved in slavery, prejudice, and war. 
7. The disunity of the moral 
 
The argument has been in terms of the psychology of moral behaviour, taking both 
"psychology" and "moral" in fairly wide senses: the capacities that allow us to participate 
in the practices that make human life productive are not homogeneous. That leaves a 
more abstract question open, whether there is an idealized concept of right behaviour 
to which these disparate capacities allow us to approximate in our fallible clumsy ways. 
I do not think there is, as long as moral concepts are supposed to apply to the full 
complexity of human situations. 
Return to the Huckleberry Finn example, and the story of the two neighbours. We 
read the Huck Finn case so that he would be  following the morally better course in 
helping Jim to escape. And if the less conventional and less well behaved neighbour is 
the one who will shelter your children in times of crisis then he is the better person. But 
the stories can easily be made more nuanced, as in real life they would be. Until things 
get grim the unconventional neighbour may be someone you reasonably complain 
about and want to have little to do with. And for all you know until the crisis strikes 
you may continue to have reason to think badly of him. (And aiding supporters of the 
minority may bring catastrophe on that minority by ruining economic cooperation 
between segments of the society.) And there may be a good chance that Jim will be 
caught and beaten to death as an example to others. Then Huck will think that he did a 
great disservice to Jim in helping him to escape. Few cases are really clear-cut. 
(Remember that Mark Twain was writing in the 1880’s, long after the time of the 
fictional events, when the history had become simple and mythical. I should add, to 
preserve the reader's opinion of me, that as Twain tells the story there is no doubt about 
what on balance Huck should do.) 
Damage, Flourishing, and Two Sides of Morality 9 
Is there always a morally best choice in such cases? Does damage-avoidance always 
trump cooperation, or vice versa? It seems very implausible that one factor will always 
dominate, even with a subtle weighting scheme. Accepting that these are dilemmas 
which will not yield to mechanical solutions (Morton 1996: I am afraid this last section 
is peppered with references to my own work), there is the further question whether they 
are moral dilemmas or general decision-making elements. Bernard Williams, as I read 
him, takes there to be incommensurable moral considerations at play in these and many 
similar cases. Whatever one does has a moral argument against it, so that a sensitive 
agent will pick what seems to be the least objectionable option and feel a specifically 
moral regret that the other option was neglected. 
I am inclined to a starker reaction. The conflict is between principles that claim the 
label of morality, each with some justice because each often serves to allow us to live 
together for mutual benefit without doing one another too much harm. When there is 
an irresolvable conflict between them there is no determinate answer to which one of 
them can best claim the label. They both normally coexist, and for reasons described 
above we normally are blind to the tensions between them. When the tensions surface 
and cannot be evaded, individual agents have hard problems about what to do. One 
consideration is which category of consideration a particular person can more 
effectively follow (Morton 1990). There are people who are good at cooperation and 
people who are good at principled rebellion, rather like the scientists who are at their 
best in Kuhnian normal science and the scientists who are at their best leading a 
scientific revolution. We need both. 
Of course there are many people in the middle, neither ethically normal 
(conventional, conformist) nor ethically revolutionary (innovative, imaginative, radical), 
just as there are in the scientific case. But even given this range it is possible for two 
people who occupy the same position in it to use very different words to describe their 
dilemmas. One person may take herself to be reconciling a moral duty to live up to 
other people's reasonable expectations of her, against her desire to be helpful to people 
she cares for. Another person, in exactly the same situation, may take herself to be 
reconciling a moral duty to react to the plight of people in difficult circumstances, 
against her desire to maintain her image in the eyes of her associates. Suppose that they 
both resolve the tension with the same action. Both will feel regret, though one will 
describe it as regret at not being able to do the right thing, and another will describe it 
as regret at not being able to give help when it is needed. 
A third person, also in exactly the same situation, may think of herself as torn 
between two moral considerations. And when she resolves the tension in exactly the 
way that the others did she also will feel regret. But she will think of it as regret that she 
could not do the right thing because she had to do a different right thing. This is what 
Williams refers to as "agent regret" (Williams 1973a, Williams 1981). But it is directed 
at the choice between the same options as the other two people, and may well feel 
exactly the same.It is not easy to individuate emotions, but the way I would describe the 
situation or three people have the same first order emotion, and react the knowledge of 
what they feel with different second-order emotions, differing in the extent to which 
they take their emotional dispositions as unworthy. (For second-order emotions see 
Mendonça 2013.) 
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All three people use the phrase "moral duty" differently. Is one misusing it? When 
we strip away the contentious labels all three are reacting to the same situation in the 
same way. All three have to balance the same competing considerations, and arrive at 
the same resolution. A hard question is what cognitive resources there are for resolving 
conflicts between incomparable desiderata (Morton 1990 again) and what makes one 
mode of resolution better than another. I do not see any reason to suspect that resolving 
conflicts between incomparables is sensitive to which side of the conflict is labelled as 
moral. That seems to me the absolutely central question. If there is no such sensitivity 
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